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Abstract 
This paper analyses how the contract structure between gas stations and the wholesale 
operator affects price strategies. Using daily data on prices of different gas stations the paper 
finds that independent dealers charge lower margins than other dealers with different 
contracts. One potential hypothesis is that this is the case because independent stations 
react more to the number of competitors. We use the introduction of a discretional regional 
excise duty (IVMDH) on gas stations to check the reaction of markups to changes in marginal 
costs of the actual number of competitors. Results are consistent with the idea that 
regardless the type of contract all dealers react notably to the increases in relative marginal 
costs by decreasing average markups. We use those results to interpret the inexistent 
reduction in markups that followed a change in the Spanish regulation that took place in 2013 
fostering competition in the retail sector. One potential interpretation is that the big increase in 
independent stations following the reform was not considered an increase in actual 
competition for most of the incumbent stations. 
Keywords: competition, oligopoly, pass-through, gasoline, excise duty. 
JEL Classification: D40, H22, H23, L13, Q41. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este documento analiza cómo la estructura contractual entre las estaciones de servicio y el 
operador mayorista afecta a las estrategias de precios. Utilizando los precios diarios de las 
estaciones de servicio, en el documento se observa que los distribuidores independientes 
cobran márgenes más bajos que otras estaciones de servicio con algún tipo de contrato en 
exclusividad con un operador al por mayor. Una explicación posible es que las estaciones 
independientes reaccionan más al número de competidores. Utilizamos la introducción de un 
impuesto autonómico especial discrecional a los carburantes (IVMDH o céntimo sanitario) 
para verificar la reacción de los márgenes a cambios en los costes marginales de los 
competidores. Los resultados son consistentes con la idea de que, independientemente del 
tipo de contrato, todos los distribuidores reaccionan notablemente a aumentos relativos 
de los costes marginales, disminuyendo, en promedio, los márgenes. Usamos esos 
resultados para interpretar la reducción inexistente de los márgenes que siguió al cambio en 
la regulación española que tuvo lugar en 2013 para fomentar la competencia en el sector 
minorista. Una posible interpretación es que para la mayoría de las estaciones de servicio el 
importante aumento de las estaciones independientes después de la reforma no se consideró 
un aumento de la competencia real. 
Palabras clave: competencia, oligopolio, gasolina, IVMDH. 
Códigos JEL: D40, H22, H23, L13, Q41. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2012, international oil prices reached the level of 120 $ per barrel and, as a consequence, 
gasoline prices peaked.1 This raise in prices increased the public concern regarding the 
competitive behaviour of the retail gas market and whether dealers were benefiting from 
positive oil price shocks. From the point of view of Spain, price setting in the retail gasoline 
market is relevant because eighty per cent of the sales of automotive fuel are channelled 
through the gas station network and according to the input output tables, manufacture of coke 
and refined petroleum products represent 4.9% of total household consumption and 3.6% of 
intermediate inputs being especially important in key sectors such as transportation 
(24.8% of their intermediate inputs are oil products), electricity (13.2%), chemistry (9%), mining 
(6.5%) and agriculture (4.2%). In the international context, the Spanish retail gasoline market is 
an interesting case to study market power because (1) historically, station ownership has been 
very concentrated among upstream suppliers; (2) Spain reacted to the raise in international oil 
prices by passing a new regulation with the aim of increasing competition in the retail segment.  
Before the reform was implemented, there were slightly less than 9,000 gas stations in 
Spain, 79% of which were directly or indirectly tied to a supplier, while the other 21% were 
independent. Independent gas stations have no exclusive dealing arrangements with any major 
supplier. They are generally very competitive, driving down prices in their area. In particular, 
some of them operate with much lower variable costs since they do not have workers. Others, 
are linked to hypermarkets and chains of supermarkets (14% of the total independent gas 
stations) using low prices as a commercial strategy to attract consumers to their main 
business. Among those related to an upstream supplier, only 23% were directly managed by it 
(from now on this type of gas station will be called “supplier operated”), while the rest were 
“branded” dealers meaning they are managed by an independent operator with an exclusivity 
contract with one single upstream supplier that guarantees the supply of fuel. Before the 
reform, this type of gas station signed contracts accepting certain limitations in terms of the 
duration of the exclusive oil supply (usually 5 years) and in most cases accepting limitations to 
the possibility of setting a free price to the public. Usually, prices of dealers were set as a fixed 
commission per litre sold that was specified in the contract. As a result of these limitations, the 
proportion of gas stations that charge different prices to those recommended by the supplier 
operator was very low (less than 10% in most years). 
The concern regarding the lack of competition (also analysed by the National Agency 
of Competitive Markets -CNMC in Spanish-) grew with the peak of international oil prices. 
Spanish government reacted to this concern and as a consequence, enacted the Royal Decree 
4/2013 (RD2013) with the aim to restrict the market power of main oil suppliers. The regulation 
eased the entrance of independent participants in the dealer market (increasing the number of 
gas stations to close to 10,000) and reduced the contractual limitations of branded gas 
stations in terms of contractual duration and the obligation to freely set their own gas prices 
leading to welfare benefits for consumers.2 However, as it is shown in figure 1, after  
                                                                          
1 For instance gasoline prices in the Euro Area peaked from almost 600 euros/000 liter on the 3rd of January 2011 to 
800 euros/000 liter on the 27th of August 2012. The increase in Spain was from 622 euros/000 liter to almost 820 
euros/000 litre. 
2  In particular, obstacles were lifted for the establishment of gas stations in retail parks and industrial areas or 
estates. In turn, wholesale oil-product operators with a provincial market share of over 30% were prohibited from 
increasing their number of supplier operated dealers or from entering into new exclusive distribution agreements 
with gas stations. Furthermore, the duration of exclusive supply agreements was limited to one year, although they 
could be extended up to three years, and recommendations on the sale price to the public were prohibited. 
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the enhancement of the reform, gas price differentials between Spain and the rest of the 
Eurozone have remained at historical maxima (between 2 and 6 cents/liter). 
Figure 1: Difference in Euro-Super 95 prices between Spain and the Eurozone net  
of duties and taxes 
 
This paper first analyses how different dealers with different contractual arrangements with 
major suppliers set their own markups and react to increases in competition. In order to do so, 
we benefit from exogenous changes of regional oil consumer taxes to analyse the competitive 
reaction of different types of gas stations depending on the number of competitors that face 
different fiscal regimes as a consequence of their distance to the border of two regions. Using 
these results we will evaluate the effectiveness of the recent reform of the Spanish retail gas 
station market by analysing changes in average markups before and after the reform by each 
type of gas station. 
 
FIGURE 1
(a) Entry into force of the RD2013
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2 Related literature and contribution 
This paper builds on previous research and relates it to other papers estimating the long run 
markup of different dealers and the short run asymmetric price responses to changes in 
wholesale prices such as Bacon (1991), Johnson (2002) and the more recent study carried 
out by the CNMC (2012) in where “rockets and feathers” behaviours were applied to the 
case of Spanish dealers. Basically, the results of these group of papers relates the lack of 
competitive behaviour with the existence of an asymmetric price response in retail prices 
when a rise or a fall in international costs takes place. There is empirical evidence indicating 
much faster response in the first case than in the second one that could reflect little effective 
competition in the sector. This paper relates to this kind of literature but analysing different 
responses by type of contract of the gas station and using a different empirical strategy to 
analyse the competitive behaviour. 
It also relates to previous research looking at the effect of contracts on prices but 
using a different empirical strategy. Some papers, use the acquisitions of independent gas 
station chains by other vertically integrated brands, others directly relate prices to some 
measure of the degree of competition or to the type of contract between gas stations and oil 
companies and finally others take advantage of divorcement laws that ban the possibility to 
vertically integrate. Studies of the first type include, for example, Hastings (2004), Houde 
(2012), Jiménez and Perdiguero (2018) and Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013); the second Sen 
(2005), Chouinard and Perloff (2007), Bello and Cavero (2008), Bello and Contín-Pilart (2010) 
and Hogg, Hurn, McDonald and Rambaldi (2012) and the third Barron and Umbeck (1984) and 
Vita (2000).  
The results of the first group of papers tend to find that changing an independent 
dealer by a supplier operated station would lead to an increase in prices. Hastings (2004), 
using a sample of gas stations from Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas, finds that 
the presence of independent gas stations reduces retail prices. Houde (2012), based on fuel 
market data for Quebec, points to an increase in prices following a vertical merger between 
two companies, as well as Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013). Jiménez and Perdiguero (2018) 
find that the Disa-Shell merger did not affect prices in the Canaries, since the latter were 
already close to monopoly levels. Similarly, those papers in the second group find that vertically 
integrated dealers charge higher prices. Sen (2005), using gas station data for 11 Canadian 
cities, negatively relates the retail prices to the aggregate market share of independent gas 
stations. Hogg et al. (2012) arrive at a similar result with information for the south-east region of 
Queensland in Australia. They find that, controlling for the cost of oil and the demographic 
changes in different localities, independent gas stations are characterised by low prices, while 
brands are associated with higher prices, and that the vertical structure of the market dictates 
the level of prices. Meanwhile, Chouinard and Perloff (2007), using data for 48 US states, find 
that differences in prices between states can be attributed to variations in demand and also to 
differences in taxation, environmental regulation and market power. For Spain, Bello y Cavero 
(2008) find that the prices of independent gas stations are lower than those related to an 
upstream supplier and that the prices of gas sold at gas stations branded dealers are higher 
than if the gas station is a supplier operated. Meanwhile, Bello and Contín-Pilart (2010), using a 
sample of gas stations covering the whole of Spain, apart from the Canary Islands, find that the 
distance to the nearest petrol station does not have a significant effect on the prices set by a 
petrol station, but that the presence of independent petrol stations intensifies the competition. 
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Finally, the third group of studies take advantage of divorcement legislations that in some US 
states banned the control of gas stations by oil companies. Both Barron and Umbeck (1984) 
and Vita (2000) find that divorcement laws caused an increase in retail fuel prices, since the 
effect of the application of a double mark-up by gas stations that were not vertically integrated 
predominated over the effect of the increase in competition. In a sense banning the vertical 
merge produced a loss in efficiency. 
Finally, it relates to some papers analysing the effect of the introduction of the regional 
levy on prices and quantities of gasoline sold. The most closely related is Stolper (2016) and 
Romero-Jordán, Jorge and Álvarez (2013). Their results suggest that service stations located in 
regions with higher indirect taxes use their pricing policy to offset the negative effects of fuel 
tourism. Also, Leal, López-Laborda and Rodrigo (2009) investigate whether the differences in 
automotive diesel prices between regions, arising from the application of the IVMDH, have any 
effect on the decisions of individuals regarding the region in which to purchase fuel. Differently 
to those papers, our paper describes the effect on prices by type of upstream relationship in all 
region in Spain. 
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3 Data 
The database is made up of individual prices for 95 octane gas notified to the Ministry of 
Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda by gas stations and suppliers of oil-related products 
for each facility in their distribution network, including all those with which they have some kind 
of link. These prices are daily prices for sales to the general public, without taking into account 
card discounts, exchangeable points and discounts given by other means. Gasoline stations 
are required to send information on the prices they charge every Monday and whenever they 
change them, with maximum advance notice of three days with respect to the date of 
application of the new prices and minimum notice of one hour before the new prices are 
effectively applied. This obligation also applies to suppliers, although the prices they report may 
be final prices or recommended prices, depending on the type of management arrangements 
for the gas station. At the same time, in the event of closure of the gas station for any reason 
(holidays, building work, etc.) the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism must be advised. 
The period considered is January 1st 2011 to December 31st 2017. This encloses 
almost 10,000 fuel stations distributed along the Spanish territory. 3 On the one hand, the price 
series used are pre-tax prices which have been calculated by deducting taxes from the sales 
prices. The purpose of this decision is to eliminate the possible distortions generated by local 
taxes differences. On the other hand, the wholesale prices used are the gas prices in 
international markets.4  
In addition to the price for sales to the general public and the date on which it is 
changed, information is also available on the location of the gas station (its address, longitude 
and latitude, including the side of the road on which it is situated). Finally, we have the 
information regarding the type of contract that the gas station has with respect to the major 
supplier. There are three types of contract arrangements. “Independent” gas stations have no 
exclusive dealing arrangements with any major supplier. Gas stations directly operated to a 
supplier (“supplier operated”) and “branded” dealers meaning a management by an 
independent operator with an exclusivity contract that guarantees the supply of fuel with one 
single supplier. 
 
                                                                          
3 Except Canary and Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla. 
4 Weighted average of Premium Unleaded Gasoline 10 ppm CIF MED (Platts) Quotes and Premium Unleaded 
Gasoline 10 ppm Cargoes CIF NWE (Platts) Quotes.  
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4 Empirical strategy 
Table 1 estimates differences of markups, defined as the final price of the product minus the 
international price of its main input, by type of contract following equation (1): 
݌௜,௧ െ ݃ܽݏ௧ ൌ ܿݐ݁ ൅ ∑ ߙሺ݆ሻ௝ୀሼ௕௥௔௡ௗ௘ௗ,௦௨௣௣௟௜௘௥ሽ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሺ݆ሻ௜,௧ ൅ ߚܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ ൅ ߛ௜,௧ ൅ ࣟ௜,௧									(1) 
where,	݌௜,௧ refers to the level of the retail gas price in euros per liter before taxes of the ݅ station 
at the ݐ period and ݃ܽݏ௧ to the wholesale price at the ݐ period in international markets. The two 
dummy variables ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐ௝ are set equal to one when the contract subscribed by the ݅ station 
corresponds with the type of contract ݆ and their values are zero in any other case. In order to 
capture differences in the demand by location and time we incorporate a variable than varies 
by station and time captured by ߛ௜,௧and the number of competitors	ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ defined as the 
number of gas stations within a radium of 15 km depending on the Euclidean distance that 
separate them. The final term ࣟ௜,௧, is a random error term. In this setting, the constant is the 
average markup for independent dealers and average markups for branded and supply 
operated stations is characterized by ܿݐ݁ ൅ ߙ௝.  
As it is observed in column 1 to 4 of table 1, independent dealers are the ones setting lower 
markups (14 cents/liter in average over the analyzed period) and markups of supplier 
STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS
Dependent variable:
p i ,t - gas  t
Competitors i ,t -0.0000548*** -0.0000662*** 0.000000887 0.00000587
(0.000) (0.000) (0.975) (0.84)
Contract i ,t
 B randed dealer 0.0269746*** 0.0277505*** 0.0265198*** 0.0272814***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Supplier operated dealer 0.0253902*** 0.02581*** 0.0256511*** 0.0261756***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.15043741 (a) 0.15059596 (a) 0.1475661*** 0.1468385***
(0.000) (0.000)
Daily fixed effects Yes Yes No No
M unicipality fixed effects Yes No No No
Zip code fixed effects No Yes No No
Daily and muncipality fixed effects No No Yes No
Daily and zip code fixed effects No No No Yes
Number o f observations 21156573 21190843 21156573 21190843
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.522 0.637 0.633
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
(a) These constants correspond to  the average of predicted values for  the dependent variable in the correspondent regression c
Hence, it is not fully comparable with the estimated constants for the others two especifications where there is a baseline fo r
a specific day and a particular geographic zone.  
Robust p-values standar errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at a confidence level 
o f 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
Fourth
Specification
Third
Specification
First
Specification
Second
Specification
STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS
TABLE 1
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operated and branded dealers are higher and very similar to each other (around an additional 
2.5 cent/liter).  
There are several reasons why independent dealers might operate with lower 
markups. In particular, different types of stations might be offering different products, being the 
branded and supplier operated gas station those that offer alternative services that also require 
to run up higher operational costs (notice that many independent stations do not offer other 
services and they might even operate without employees). On the other hand, independent 
dealers might be cross subsidizing their sales with revenues of other businesses such as in the 
case of the stations linked to supermarkets. Finally, supplier operated and branded stations 
might be not adjusting prices to the real competitive pressure of each individual station. 
In the following section the paper explores more in depth whether this last 
hypothesis might be at play checking whether different dealers react differently to increasing 
real competition.  
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5 Reaction to real change in competition: discretional regional excise duties 
This section analyzes whether competition affects differently gas stations with different contract 
structure following equation (2): 
݌௜,௧ െ ݃ܽݏ௧ ൌ ∑ ߚሺ݆ሻ௝ୀሼ௕௥௔௡ௗ௘ௗ,௦௨௣௣௟௜௘௥ሽ ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሺ݆ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ࣟ௜,௧  (2) 
In this setting we incorporate a fixed effect by gas station ߤ௜ and daily dummies ߜ௧. As 
a consequence, the coefficients ߚሺ݆ሻ identifies the change in markups due to a change in the 
number of competitors per type of contract.  
Column 1 of table 2 shows that, the increase in the number of competitors decreases 
markups to all types of dealers. Nevertheless, competition affects more importantly 
independent than non-independent dealers since increasing 10 additional competitors in the 
radius of 15 km decreases by 0.6 cent /liter the markup of independent dealers, while it 
decreases by 0.4 cent /liter the markup of the other two types of gas stations. In any case, one 
should notice that the change in markups due to competition appears to be very small. This 
small reaction and the differential effect among types of gas stations could be attributed to an 
endogenous location strategy of different types of gas stations. Indeed, opening a new station 
is not an easy task and the distribution of independent and non-independent stations is not 
random since many independent stations are located outside a city where could be easier to 
obtain a new license. Also, it is not clear that any new station competes with the rest of gas 
stations that were located in the area if they were offering different products. On this regard, 
despite the suggestive evidence in column 1, it is not appropriate to conclude that an 
exogenous increase in competition might weakly affect to all dealers and especially to 
independent ones.  
In order to have a cleaner natural experiment on this regard we are going to exploit 
exogenous changes in marginal costs of actual competitors by different types of gasoline 
dealers. In particular, we are going to use the effect on prices of a discretional regional excise 
duty (IVMDH) on competing gas stations. After 2002, regional governments were allowed to 
impose a tax on the fuel sold. Most of the regions only decided to use this possibility during the 
last recession as a way to alleviate their fiscal problems. That is the reason why, within a 
particular local market, the imposition of this tax is exogenous to economic conditions. 
The IVMDH is an excise duty levied on the volume of fuel sold. It was introduced in 
2002 in order to increase the revenues of the regional (autonomous) governments. The tax has 
two tranches: a State tranche and a regional one (the latter popularly known as the  
“health cent”). Under the State tranche the tax has been levied on gas at the rate of 2.4 cent 
/liter ever since its introduction. The regional governments, meanwhile, may decide to establish 
a regional rate of tax subject to a ceiling that is currently set at 4.8 cent /liter.5 The rates at 
which the regional tranche of the IVMDH is charged on gas, and the changes made since the 
introduction of the tax, are set out in table 3. 
                                                                          
5 This amounts between 0% and 5% of the total gross price of gas and could amount 30% of the markup. Before 
2012, the regional tranche was paid by the retail dealer while after 2012 was the supplier who distributed the gas 
who had to liquidate it after being reimbursed by the owner of the gas station at the moment of purchase. 
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STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS
Dependent variable:
p i ,t - gas  t
Total competitors i ,t -0.000279***
(0.000)
 Independent dealer -0.0004011*** -0.0003942***
(0.000) (0.000)
 Branded dealer -0.000239*** -0.000232***
(0.000) (0.000)
 Supplier operated dealer -0.0002797*** -0.0002719***
(0.000) (0.000)
Competitors with fiscal disadvantage i ,t 0.00000215***
(0.757.000)
 Independent dealer 0.0000485***
(0.004.000)
 Branded dealer 0.0000439
(0)
 Supplier operated dealer -0.0000429***
(0.000)
Competitors with fiscal advantage i ,t -0.0023408***
(0.000)
 Independent dealer -0.0025289***
(0.000)
 Branded dealer -0.001867***
(0.000)
 Supplier operated dealer -0.0026567***
(0.000)
Fixed effects in petro l stations Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects in day Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 21190762 21190762 21190762
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.647 0.647
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Robust p-values standar errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 
confidence level o f 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
Third
Specification
First
Specification
Second
Specification
STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS
TABLE 2
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As this table shows, the importance of the “health cent” has been increasing over time with the 
goal to reduce the regional deficits. The first regional government to introduce the health cent 
was Madrid in 2002. In 2012, a large number of regional governments introduced or increased 
the “health cent”, generally up to the top rate permitted. Indeed by the end of the year all 
regions levied the tax with the exception of Aragon, the Basque Country and La Rioja.6  
With the location information of gas stations competitors can be divided among those 
who have a fiscal advantage, those who have disadvantage and those who are treated with the 
same fiscal system. As an example, see figure 2, for the case of gas stations in the Spanish 
region of Navarra and bordering regions on the 1st of July.  
                                                                          
6 Although tax was levied in Navarra between July 2012 and December 2013 and between January 2016 and 
December 2016. 
Date
Rate       
(€/000 
litres)
Date
Rate       
(€/000 
litres)
Andalusia 10/7/10 24 23/6/12 48
Aragon 1/1/16 24
Asturias 1/1/04 24 1/1/13 48
Balearic Islands 1/5/12 48
Cantabria 2/6/12 48 1/1/14 24
1/1/15 0
Castile-la Mancha 1/1/06 24 1/5/12 48
Castile-Leon 1/3/12 48 1/1/15 16
1/1/16 0
Catalonia 1/8/04 24 1/4/12 48
Valencia 1/1/06 24 10/1/12 48
Extremadura 1/1/11 24 29/6/12 48
1/4/15 38
Galicia 1/1/04 24 1/1/14 48
Madrid 1/8/02 1 1/1/03 17
Murcia 1/1/11 24 1/11/12 48
Navarre 1/7/12 24 1/1/14 0
1/1/16 24
1/1/17 0
Basque Country
Rioja
Gasoline
Introduction of regional 
IVMDH
Change
REGIONAL TRANCHE OF HYDROCARBON 
RETAIL SALES TAX (a)
TABLE 3
SOURCE: BE calculations
a. Not applicable in the Canary Islands, Ceuta or Melilla. No data is shown for the regions 
that do not levy tax under the regional tranche. 
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Empirically, the paper analyzes the change in the markup before and after the introduction of 
the levy according to equation (3): 
݌௜,௧ െ ݃ܽݏ௧ ൌ෍ ߚሺ݆ሻ௝ୀሼ௕௥௔௡ௗ௘ௗ,௦௨௣௣௟௜௘௥ሽ ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሺ݆ሻ௜௧ ൅ 
൅෍ ߚሺ݆ሻ
௝ୀሼ௕௥௔௡ௗ௘ௗ,௦௨௣௣௟௜௘௥ሽ
ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧௅௢௪௘௥	ூ௏ெ஽ு ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሺ݆ሻ௜௧ ൅ 
൅෍ ߚሺ݆ሻ
௝ୀሼ௕௥௔௡ௗ௘ௗ,௦௨௣௣௟௜௘௥ሽ
ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ு௜௚௛௘௥	ூ௏ெ஽ு ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሺ݆ሻ௜௧ ൅ 
ߤ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ࣟ௜,௧       (3) 
where ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧௅௢௪௘௥	ூ௏ெ஽ு is the number of competitors that face a fiscal advantage and 
ܿ݋݉݌௜,௧ு௜௚௛௘௥	ூ௏ெ஽ு is the number of competitors that face a fiscal disadvantage. 
Column 2 in table 2 shows that gas stations that are at the border and have a fiscal 
disadvantage tend to reduce their markups. The economic magnitude of this decrease is 
similar to the size of the imposed tax. This is the case because in average gas stations have 8 
competitors with fiscal advantage, hence the coefficient of 0.23 must be multiplied by this 
amount to reach 2 cents /liter. The results are consistent by those obtained in Stolper (2016) 
and Romero-Jordán, Jorge and Álvarez (2013) and suggesting that service stations located in 
regions with higher indirect taxes offset this disadvantage by decreasing markups. On the other 
hand, those who have advantage do not react much to the change. Notice that despite facing 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient, the economic magnitude is not relevant since it 
is 0.005 cent /liter. This no-reaction is consistent with the previous reaction of levied gasoline 
stations since those affected by the levy were the ones who decreased their markups, as a 
consequence it was not necessary for those with a fiscal advantage to react at all.  
Column 3 does the same exercise but distinguishing by type of gas station. We 
observe a similar result regardless the type of contract that the gas station has with respect the 
upstream supplier. In particular, both independent and supplier operated dealers decrease their 
margins by 0.25 cent /liter and 0.26 cent /liter respectively, while those branded stations 
reduced slightly less 0.19 cent /liter. On the other hand, regardless the type of contract  
FIGURE 2 
N
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the increase in markups with disadvantage competitors is minor (0.01 cent/liter for independents, 
0.004 cent /liter for supplier operated and not even significant for branded dealers). 
We interpret those results as suggestive evidence that real competition, defined as a 
change in the actual marginal cost of current competitors, affect all gas stations regardless the 
type of contract they have. Moreover, fixed effect estimation of the effect of new gas stations 
on markups might be downward biased due to both the endogenous location of firms and the 
possibility that new agents were competing in different segments of the market. 
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6 Gas market after the reform 
In this section, we use the previous results to interpret the effects of the 2013 reform. As the 
requirements to open a gas station were eased, between 2013 and 2017, the number of gas 
stations went up (see panel A of figure 3) from 8.979 to 9.805. Indeed, this increase is almost 
fully attributed to new independent stations probably due to the restriction enhanced in the 
regulation that limits the percentage of stations selling a particular brand in non independent 
station to be lower than 30% of all stations in the corresponding province7 (see panel B of 
figure 3). These developments raised the percentage of independent stations from 20% in 
2013 to 31% in 2017. Since 2013 the number of non independent stations remained constant 
(there were 6.877 non independent stations in 2013 and 6.779 in 2017). Within them the share 
of branded dealers increased. The increase in branded dealers is attributed to a strategic 
behavior of supplier operated dealers that decide to leave the management of the station to 
independent agents with an exclusivity contract.  
 
As a result of the increase in competition and the reduction of the contractual limitations of 
branded gas stations to freely set their own gas prices, one should expect two consequences: 
— A general decrease in average markups. 
— A relatively higher decrease of markups for branded dealers because they are not only 
affected by the increase in competition but also by the changes in the contractual 
relationship allowed with the wholesale supplier. 
The first hypothesis could be checked using Eurostat data on weekly prices of gas 
stations by country in the EU for the period 2011-2017. We estimate the differential average 
markup of the gas market in Spain and different countries in the Euro Area (EA). The potential 
relative effect of the reform in Spain is estimated using the following specification: 
݌௜,௧ െ ݃ܽݏ௧ ൌ ܿݐ݁ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ 1ሺ݅ ൌ ܵ݌ܽ݅݊ሻ௜ ൅ ߚଶ1ሺݐ ൐ ܮܽݓሻ௧ ൅ 
൅ߚଷ ∗ 1ሺ݅ ൌ ܵ݌ܽ݅݊ሻ௜1ሺݐ ൐ ܮܽݓሻ௧ ൅ ߛ௜,௧ ൅ ࣟ௜,௧                                                             (3) 
                                                                          
7 This limit was eliminated on July 1, 2016. 
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SOURCE: Author's calculation.
a. Entry into force of the RD2013.
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Here, ݌௜,௧ െ ݃ܽݏ௧ refers to the average markup in country ݅ in week ݐ, 1ሺ݅ ൌ ܵ݌ܽ݅݊ሻ௜ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the observation corresponds to Spain and a dummy variable 
1ሺݐ ൐ ܮܽݓሻ௧ that is equal to 1 if the corresponding week belongs to the period after the 
approval of the regulation. In order to capture differences in the demand by country and time 
we incorporate ߛ௜,௧ that is a weekly fixed effect in some specifications. In others, the 
observations are averaged by month and country and ߛ௜,௧ includes country dummies and  
the monthly unemployment rate in the country. The error term is ࣟ௜,௧ and ܿݐ݁ represents the 
average markup of the comparison country/group of countries. In this setting the average 
markup in Spain is different to the one in other countries by ߚଵ and this difference will change 
by ߚଷ	in relative terms after the reform. 
Table 4 contains the results of these estimates. With the exception of Italy, average 
markups in Spain are higher than those in other countries (Germany, France, Ireland and 
Portugal). In particular, Spanish gas stations charge an additional amount of 4 cents/liter 
compared to France, 3 cents/liter compared to Germany and Ireland, 0,3 cents/liter compared 
to Portugal and -1 cents/liter compared to Italy. Also, notice that for all countries the relative 
markup in Spain increases after the reform between 2 and 3 cents/liter. The relative increase is 
consistent in all specifications (single countries, group of big countries and group of periphery 
countries) or even taking into consideration different country specific macrodevelopments when 
incorporating the unemployment rate. Finally, the increase in average markups in Spain after 
the reform appears to be maintained after several years (for the period 2016-2017). Hence, 
even in the case that dealers required some time to learn how to operate in the new 
environment it seems that they kept higher markups in Spain compared to other countries. 
In order to check the validity of the second hypothesis, Eurostat does not provide 
prices by type of contract hence equation (3) cannot be run interacting type of contract and 
country of location. However, equation (1) for Spanish dealers could be run interacting average 
margins by type of contract and time dummies. This is illustrative of how different dealers are 
changing their average markups. Table 5 shows the results. The two columns represent 
different specifications of ߛ௜,௧. Column 1 in Table 5 controls for fixed effects by gas stations. 
Hence this column identifies changes in average markups for either independent, branded and 
supplier operated dealers. Column 2 controls for fixed effects and daily dummies separately. 
On this regard, daily dummies capture changes that apply to all stations and only relative 
changes of two types of stations could be identified.  
Column 1 shows that independent dealers after the reform decreased their markups by 
0.1 cents/liter whereas branded dealers increased their markups by 1.3 cents/liter and supplier 
operated dealers increased them by around 0.7 cents/liter. The differences in reaction by type of 
dealer are kept in column 2. Indeed, independent dealers decreased markups by 1 cent/liter 
respect to supplier operated stations and branded dealers increased relative markups by 0.4 
cents/liter. This behaviour is even exacerbated during the last years of the sample (2016-2017). In 
particular, according to column 1 average markups of independent stations decreased by 0.5 
cents/liter, those of branded dealers increased by 3.5 cents/liter and those of supplier operated 
dealers increased by 2.6 cents/liter. Similar results are obtained in the second column. In columns 
3 and 4 we add the number of competitors as an additional robustness check. 
Summarizing, Spanish markups of gasoline stations have increased respect to  
the evolution of those in other countries after the new regulation despite the big increase  
in the number of independent gasoline stations. Within Spanish stations, markups decreased for 
independent dealers whereas they even increase for branded and supplier operated stations. 
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Dependent variable:
p i ,t - gas t
Spain dummy 0.0270512*** 0.0375771*** -0.0120552*** 0.0270167*** 0.003476* 0.0175244*** 0.0061458*** 0.0462973***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001)
after reform dummy 0.0077811*** -0.0009734*** -0.0080513*** -0.0023778 0.0075089*** 0.0007195 -0.0009734 0.0021053
(0.008) (0.276) (0.001.000) (0.62) (0.004) (0.72) (0.72) (0.405)
Spain dummy#
after reform 
0.0131107*** 0.0185642*** 0.0289423*** 0.0233479*** 0.0134139*** 0.0202057*** 0.0219014*** 0.0195922***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2016-2017 year
dummy
-0.0002385 0.0060855*** -0.0057028** 0.0065719 -0.001014 0.0000481 -0.0000483 -0.0034507
(0.916) (0.01) (0.033) (0.084) (0.771) (0.9820) (0.987) (0.227)
Spain dummy#
2016-2017 year
0.0047667 -0.0018001 0.0101259*** -0.0024045 0.0054376 0.0043641 0.0043863 -0.0001977
dummy (0.122) (0.568) (0.002) (0.590) (0.177) (0.134) (0.221) (0.968)
Unemployment 
rate
-0.0012445*
(0.088)
Weekly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
M onthly fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
Country fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
CONSTANT 0.1126152*** 0.1021016*** 0.1517525*** 0.1127093*** 0.136203*** 0.1221564*** 0.1335549*** 0.1230816***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of
observations 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 504
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.70 0.27 0.39 0.25 0.55 0.34 0.44
F 183 351 49 117 66 192 81 66
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
(a) B ig includes Germany, France and Italy.
(b) Periphery includes Italy, Portugal and Irland.
Robust p-values standar errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at a confidence level o f 90%, 95% 
and 99%, respectively.
B ig
(a)
Periphery
(b)
A ll
countriesGermany France Italia Irlanda Portugal
Sample with Spain and:
SPANISH VERSUS EUROPEAN COMPETITION TABLE 4
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STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS
Dependent variable:
p i ,t - gas t
competitors  i ,t -0.000047*** -0.0001028***
(0.000) (0.000)
Contract i t
 Independent dealer
   After RD2013 -0.0024592*** -0.0074455*** -0.0023462*** -0.0074734***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     2016-2017 years -0.0060666*** -0.0201269*** -0.0058396*** -0.0202348***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Branded dealer
   Before RD2013 0.0037929*** 0.0037621*** 0.0037319*** 0.0036503***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
   After RD2013 0.0096829*** 0.0046517*** 0.0097742*** 0.0045826***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     2016-2017 years 0.0172558*** 0.0029441*** 0.0174817*** 0.0028356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Supplier operated dealer
   Before RD2013 -0.0004793*** 0.0000697*** -0.0005176*** 0.00000705***
(0.000) (0.207.000) (0.000) (0.898.000)
   After RD2013 0.0039577*** - 0.0040707*** -
(0.000) (0.000)
     2016-2017 years 0.0137338*** - 0.0140047*** -
(0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.1628077*** - 0.1651416*** -
(0.000) (0.000)
Daily contro l No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects in petro l stations Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 21190843 21190843 21190843 21190843
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.654 0.418 0.655
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Robust p-values standar errors are reported in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 
confidence level o f 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
STABLE LONG RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE REFORM
TABLE 5
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7 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper finds empirical evidence about the different behaviour of gasoline dealers depending 
on the kind of contract set up with the operator supplier. In general, independent dealers 
charge lower markups than those dealers more related to the upstream supplier.  
The paper checks one potential explanation for this different behavior that is a different 
reaction to competition by dealers with different contracts. Usual regressions exploiting the 
variation in the number of competitors provide small effects of this variable in markups that are 
more concentrated on independent stations. Changes in the number of competitors might be 
endogenous to location specific demand developments, hence we benefit from the 
introduction of a discretional regional excise duty (IVMDH) on gas stations in particular Spanish 
regions. We check the pass through of the levy to prices of stations with different contracts 
that were located in the border of a levied and a non-levied region. Results are consistent with 
the idea that regardless the type of contract the gas station has, all of them react to 
competition more intensively than basic regressions would predict. 
We use those results to interpret the effect on prices of a regulation change in Spain 
that occurred after the increase in oil prices in 2012. The law was enhanced with the aim to 
restrict the market power of main oil suppliers. The regulation eased the entrance of 
independent participants in the dealer market and reduced the contractual limitations  
of branded gas stations to freely set their own gas prices leading to welfare benefits for 
consumers. Our results suggest that: 
— Despite a notable increase in independent operators during the period post reform 
Spanish markups increased compared to Eurozone dealers.  
— According to the type of contract, only Spanish independent dealers decreased their 
markups after the reform while both supplier operated and branded dealers 
increased. While the first result was expected given the increase in independent 
competitors, the other two results were not. 
One potential explanation is that the relevant market for different dealers might be 
different by type of contract. It might be the case that independent dealers, which were 
increasing in number (especially in the low cost segment), only compete against other 
independent dealers while branded and supplier operated dealers compete with each other. 
Gas stations are not randomly allocated geographically. Hence, when changing marginal costs 
of competitors it is likely that “real” competition is affected. On the contrary, most of the 
increase in the number of competitors after the reform was due to the entrance of independent 
dealers. Those gas stations might be only competing against other independent dealers. As a 
consequence, the measure of the government could have increased the incentive of branded 
and supplier operated dealers to differentiate their product even more and increasing their 
market power to obtain higher markups. 
Additionally it seems that until the moment in which it was written this paper, the 
measures trying to liberalize the market of branded dealers had no effect on their markups 
since their behavior was still very similar to that of supplier operated dealers.  
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